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1 Introduction
Our societies are becoming older and older. As reported by Gruber and Wise (1998), the
ratio of individuals above 65 over individuals aged between 20 and 64 will approximately
double from year 2000 to 2050 in most developed countries. The sources of population
aging lie in two demographic phenomena: rising life expectancy and declining fertility.
For almost eighty years, fertility rates have been declining in both Europe and the US.
This drop has been quite dramatic, falling from around 3 children per woman in 1920 or
1930 to the current levels of 1.2 to 2 children per woman, depending on the country. This
decline has not however been steady over time. In the post world war II period, fertility
rates have been increasing suddenly in all industrialized countries (baby boom) and have
started to fall again in the mid 60s. Since the beginning of the 80s, fertility rates has been
more or less stable (Boldrin et al. (2005)).
This demographic trend puts an increasing pressure on the financial viability of Pay-
As-You-Go (PAYG) systems: for given parameters of the system, there are not enough
contributors to finance the pensions of the baby-boomers. These systems thus need to
be reformed. We consider in this paper parametric reforms of the PAYG system, that
consist in adjusting its key parameters. To deal with population aging, one can raise
the contribution rate, decrease the level of benefits and/or increase the retirement age.
As argued by Cremer and Pestieau (2000), this problem is mainly political. Any reform
induces some conflicts of interest between generations. Old workers and retirees prefer to
raise taxes rather than to cut benefits whereas young workers have opposite preferences.
The retirees favor an increase in the retirement age, as they benefit from this change but
do not support its cost, whereas some workers may oppose it. In these circumstances,
how will these conflicts be resolved? How will the burden of the demographic transition
be shared among the different generations?
Our aim is to provide some elements of answer to these questions. We consider a
society that faces a downward fertility shock in a given period and needs to adjust its
PAYG system to maintain its financial viability. Individuals are identical in all respects,
except for their age. During working life, they contribute to the pension system. After
retirement, they receive a pension benefit. We assume no savings, so that pensions is the
only source of income for a retiree. The government also collects a lump-sum tax on all
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individuals, workers and retirees, that can be used to restore the balance of the PAYG
budget.
Section 3 determines the preferences of the citizens with respect to the pension system
in the steady state before the demographic shock. The optimal contribution rate of
the workers is increasing with age and the retirees want the tax rate to be as high as
possible. This result was first established by Browning (1975) and is by now standard in
the literature on the political economy of pensions (see for example Sjoblom (1985)). We
also determine the optimal retirement age among different age groups. We show that it
is constant until a threshold age and then equal to the age of the individual considered.
Section 4 addresses the demographic transition. In a first step, we determine the
values of the income taxes needed to balance the government budget constraint when no
parameter of the pension system is altered. This situation is referred to as the no reform
case, or status quo. As the ratio of the number of workers to the number of retirees is
decreasing over time, these taxes should increase with time.
We next consider reforms of the PAYG system (taking place simultaneously to the
fertility shock) and first compare a marginal increase in the contribution rate with a
marginal cut in benefits. We show that, when there is perfect consumption smoothing in
the steady state before the shock and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is below 1, the
steady state decisive voter prefers to cut benefits rather than to increase the contribution
rate. When this latter is older than the median age individual, the majority of the voters
hold the same preferences. The intuition behind this result is that, even though it yields
a decrease in lifetime income, a drop in benefit leads to a repartition of lifetime income
along the life-cycle that is more in line with the individuals’ preferences.
The previous results concerned the reform of the payroll tax rate or the benefit level.
What about raising the retirement age? It turns out that, with perfect consumption
smoothing in the steady state, the decisive voter in this steady state votes for this reform,
when compared to the status quo. Here again this means that it is likely to receive a
strong political support. The numerical simulations presented in section 5 confirm this
finding. They also show that increasing the retirement age is majority preferred to the
other two reforms (cut in benefits and increase in the contribution rate) for a large set of
parameter values.
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The reforms just described were assumed to take place contemporaneously to the
shock. We envisage in subsection 4.4 the possibility to defer the reform to a later date.
We find that delaying the reform has two effects, of opposite direction. On the one hand,
it changes the age of the individuals indifferent between implementing the reform or not.
As time goes on, older people starts favoring a cut in benefits. This makes the political
support for reducing pension benefits increase over time. On the other hand, those people
who support this reform are the younger ones. Due to population ageing, their proportion
is decreasing with time, leading to a lower political support. The way the political support
for a reform evolves over time thus depends on the comparison of these two effects.
Related Literature
There exists a large literature, starting from Browning (1975) and surveyed in Galasso
and Profeta (2002), that study analytically the majority voting determination of PAYG
pension systems in the steady state.
Most of the studies that address the problem of social security reform are based on cal-
ibrated quantitative models in which the welfare effects of different reforms are calculated
(see, among others, Conesa and Krueger (1999), Conesa and Garriga (2008a, 2009b), De
Nardi et al. (1999), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007)). Moreover, these articles often focus
on the transition to a fully funded system.
To our knowledge, the only papers that approach this question from an analytical
standpoint are Breyer and Stolte (2001) and Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008). Breyer
and Stolte (2001) show that, when taxation is distortionary (endogenous labor supply),
pensioners share the burden of the demographic change with the workers, meaning that
pension benefits are decreased. Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) consider a two-period
dynamic probabilistic voting model with logarithmic utility. Their main findings are
that population ageing should lead to higher contribution tax rates and a larger share of
pensions in GDP.
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2 The model
2.1 Timeline and demographics
The model is a continuous time overlapping-generations model where each agent lives for
an interval of size l. His life is divided between working life, from birth to age a, and
retirement life, from age a to death at age l.
At a given point in time t, retirees comprehend the group of people older than a, those
born from t− l to t− a, and workers are those younger than a, those born from t− a to
t. We denote N rt the number of retirees and N
w
t the number of workers, both at time t.
2.2 Wages and taxes
All workers receive the same wage, normalized to one. They pay two types of taxes: a
linear contribution rate τ to finance the PAYG pension system and an income tax T to
the general government budget. The difference between these two taxes is that only the
workers contribute to the pension system, whereas both the workers and the retirees pay
the income tax. The proceeds of the income tax are used to complement the financing of
pension benefits when the PAYG’s budget is in deficit. This assumption accounts for the
supplementary role that general government revenues play on the financing of pensions.
It will also be useful to allow some imbalancement in PAYG budget before reform takes
place, enabling the model to study the timing of the reform. Consumption at date t is
thus cwt = 1− τ t−Tt for a worker and crt = bt−Tt for a retiree where bt stands for pension
benefits.
2.3 Preferences
The unique heterogeneity among agents is their birth date. The monetary disutility from
working is assumed constant1 and denoted by γ. Instantaneous utility of consumption
1One could alternatively assume that the disutility from working is increasing with age. Although this
is likely to be true for manual workers, it is not so likely for intellectual workers: professors, administrators,
... One could also argue that the utility of leisure is decreasing with age: free time is worth more when
younger. What matters for retirement decision is the difference in utility levels when working with respect
to when retired, and this difference may be increasing, constant or decreasing depending on the which
effect dominates: the (possibly) increasing disutility from work or the decreasing utility of leisure. This
paper takes no side in this discussion and assumes that the parameter γ that captures this difference is
constant.
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u(c) is assumed continuous, twice differentiable and strictly concave.
The life-cycle utility of a worker and a retiree aged x at time t are respectively given
by
Uwt (x) ≡
t+a−x∫
t
e−β(v−t)(u (1− τ v − Tv)− γ) dv +
t+l−x∫
t+a−x
e−β(v−t)u (bv − Tv) dv (1)
and
U rt (x) ≡
t+l−x∫
t
e−β(v−t)u (bv − Tv) dv, (2)
where β is the discount factor.
2.4 Resource constraint
The Government Budget Constraint (GBC) at any time t is
N rt bt = N
w
t τ t + (N
w
t +N
r
t )Tt. (3)
Equation (3) states that PAYG benefits (left hand side) must be completely financed from
the proceeds of the PAYG contribution rate plus transfers from the general government
budget at each time t (right hand side). Note that the workers pay the contribution rate
(τ t) and the income tax (Tt) while the retirees pay only the latter.
Assumption 1 No deficit on PAYG budget in the initial steady state.
This assumption implies that, in the steady state before the fertility shock, there is no
need to supplement PAYG revenues with transfers from the general government budget:
Tt = 0. The government budget constraint in the steady state before the shock is thus
N rt bss = N
w
t τ ss, (4)
where bss and τ ss are the benefit level and the contribution rate in the steady state
respectively. Equation (5) below gives the well known formula that pension benefit is
the product of the contribution rate times the inverse of the dependency rate2 when the
PAYG budget is balanced:
bss = τ ssρss (n, a, l) , (5)
2The dependency rate is defined as the ratio of the number of retirees to the number of workers,
Nrt /N
w
t .
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where
ρss =
Nwt
N rt
=
t∫
t−a
ensds
t−a∫
t−l
ensds
=
1− e−na
e−na − e−nl = e
nl e
na − 1
enl − ena . (6)
The dependency rate (and its inverse ρ) depends on the fertility rate (n), total lifetime
(l) and on the size of working life (a). The fertility rate and total lifetime are exogenous
demographic parameters while the size of working life is an endogenous parameter of the
PAYG system.
3 Initial steady state
In the initial steady state, the rate of population growth is constant and equal to n. The
PAYG system in this steady state is characterized by the triplet (τ ss, bss, ass), chosen
through the political process. We make no specific assumption about this political pro-
cess. We simply assume that the pension system in the steady state is optimal for some
individual, of age xd.
We study in the next section the reform of the system following a negative fertility
shock. But before, we describe the preferences of the different individuals on the contri-
bution rate and the benefit level in the initial steady state.
3.1 Optimal contribution rates
Using (2), the retirees optimal contribution rate is given by the following program:
max
τ∈[0,1]
U rss (x) ≡
t+l−x∫
t
e−β(v−t)u (ρssτ) dv, (7)
where the pension benefit given by the steady state resource constraint (5) is already
substituted into the objective function. Since they do not contribute to PAYG anymore,
the preferred contribution rate of the retirees is the maximal one (τ = 1).
Using (1), the workers optimal contribution rate solves:
max
τ∈[0,1]
Uwss (x) ≡
t+a−x∫
t
e−β(v−t)(u (1− τ)− γ) dv +
t+l−x∫
t+a−x
e−β(v−t)u (ρssτ) dv (8)
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The relationship of optimal tax rates with respect to age is described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 The preferred contribution rate is strictly increasing in worker’s age and
it is maximal for retirees:
τ ∗ss(x)
{
is strictly increasing in x , if x ∈ [0, a)
= 1 , if x ∈ [a, l].
Proof. The program of the workers (8) can be written:
max
τ
(− 1
β
(e−β(a−x) − 1))(u (1− τ)− γ) + (− 1
β
(e−β(l−x) − e−β(a−x)))u (ρssτ)
which first-order condition is
(e−β(a−x) − 1)u′ (1− τ ∗ss)− (e−β(l−x) − e−β(a−x))ρssu′ (ρssτ ∗ss) = 0. (9)
Applying the implicit function theorem gives
dτ ∗ss
dx
=
βe−β(a−x)u′ (1− τ ∗ss)− β(e−β(l−x) − e−β(a−x))ρssu′ (ρssτ ∗ss)
(e−β(a−x) − 1)u′′ (1− τ ∗ss) + (e−β(l−x) − e−β(a−x))ρ2ssu′′ (ρssτ ∗ss)
> 0.
This proposition is a generalization of the result already established in the literature for
the three-periods overlapping generations case.3 Older workers maximize over a reduced
horizon, since they do not take into account their past contributions in their optimization
problem. In other words, the PAYG return increases with worker’s age, since its benefit
is the same for all agents, but its cost is decreasing with age.
The profile of optimal contribution rates is represented on the figure below.
3.2 Optimal retirement ages
The preferred retirement age of an individual aged x, a∗ss (x), maximizes his remaining
lifetime utility. This choice implies that the agent will be a worker, when x < a∗ss, or a
retiree, when x ≥ a∗ss. When making his choice, the agent must take into account that this
retirement age will be mandatory to everyone in the PAYG system: a higher retirement
age yields a smaller dependency ratio.4 The optimal retirement age is thus
3See Browning (1975) or Sjoblom (1985).
4ρss (a), defined in (6), is strictly increasing in a, with ρss (0) = 0 and lim
a→l
ρss (a) = +∞.
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x
a
τ∗ss(x)
1
Figure 1: Preferences over the contribution rate by age cohort
a∗ss = arg max
{[
max
a
Uwss (x)
s.t. a > x
]
,
[
max
a
U rss (x)
s.t. a ≤ x
]}
(10)
If an agent aged x prefers to be retired, then he maximizes U rss (x) (given in (7)) with
respect to a, subject to a ≤ x. The solution to this problem is a∗ss (x) = x. In words,
he chooses the highest retirement age such that he is retired. On the one hand, choosing
a∗ss > x would violate the maximization constraint. On the other hand, choosing a
∗
ss < x
would decrease the pension benefit since there would be more retirees to divide PAYG
revenues and less workers to finance it.
If an agent aged x prefers to be a worker, then he maximizes Uwss (x) (given in (8)) with
respect to a, subject to a > x. Denoting a˜ the solution to this program, the first-order
condition on a˜, taking into account the impact of a higher retirement age on the inverse
of the dependency rate, is given by:
e−β(˜a−x)(u (1− τ)− γ − u (ρssτ))−
1
β
(e−β(l−x) − e−β(˜a−x))u′ (ρssτ) τ
∂ρss
∂a
= 0
⇔ (u (1− τ)− γ − u (ρssτ))−
1
β
(e−β(l−a˜) − 1)u′ (ρssτ) τ
∂ρss
∂a
= 0. (11)
The first two terms capture the effect of a marginal increase in working life and the third
term corresponds to the marginal decrease in retirement life. The last term captures
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Figure 2: Optimal retirement ages in the steady state
the impact of a higher retirement age on the level of pension benefits. This term is not
usually acknowledged in the endogenous retirement literature (Crawford and Lilien (1981),
Sheshinski (1978)) because this latter deals with the individual choice on retirement age,
not extensible to the other agents in the pension system. Here, the retirement age is
applicable to all agents within the pension system. Lacomba and Lagos (2007) name this
effect of a higher retirement age on the value of pension benefits as the macro effect. This
effect is positive, implying that u(1− τ ss)− γ < u (bss). In words, agents get an increase
in utility when they retire.
Observe that condition (11) does not depend on x. This means that all the individuals
who choose to be workers have the same optimal retirement age.
The results concerning the preferences over the retirement age in the steady state
before the shock are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 For a given payroll tax rate, the preferred retirement age of individuals
younger than a˜ is a˜. The preferred retirement age of an individual aged x, with x ≥ a˜ is
x.
The profile of preferred retirement ages is represented on figure 2.
In the remainder of the paper, we shall assume that ass = a˜, meaning that the decisive
voter in the steady state, xd, is younger than a˜.
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4 Adjustment to the fertility shock
4.1 Demographic transition
This section studies the political economy of PAYG’s adjustment to a negative fertility
shock. It assumes that instantaneous population growth rate is reduced from n to m at
time to.
Assumption 2 The population growth rate is{
n , for t ∈ ( −∞, to)
m , for t ∈ [ to,+∞) with n > m.
This shock produces a long transition period and the new steady state is achieved
only at time to + l.
5 Notice that the size of the transition period does not depend on the
shock’s size. During this demographic transition, the dependency rate is strictly increasing
(ρ˙t < 0, for t ∈ (to, to + l)). If no reform is undertaken, then the PAYG per capita deficit
is forever positive (Tt (∅) > 0, for t > to) and strictly increasing during the demographic
transition (T˙t (∅) > 0, for t ∈ (to, to + l), where ∅ stands for no reform). These properties
of the pension system during the demographic transition are demonstrated in appendix A.
Figure 3 illustrates the adjustment path of ρt and Tt during the demographic transition.
The results above shed some initial light on the problem of reforming PAYG during
demographic transition. If we want a reform that eliminates PAYG’s deficit at a given
time t1, then immediately after this reform (at t1+) the deficit would reappear. Similarly,
if we want a reform that eliminates PAYG’s deficit within a given time interval [t1, t2],
then PAYG budget necessarily would produce a superavit in the beginning of the interval
and a deficit at its end.
4.2 The reforms’ set
Confronted to an increasing dependency rate (ρ˙t < 0) agents may agree on reforming the
PAYG system. The reforms’ set include the full set of parametric reforms: increasing the
contribution rate, increasing the retirement age and decreasing pension benefits.
5If one assumes a life expectancy of 80 years, this implies that the transition would take 80 years to
accomplish.
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Figure 3: Demographic transition
Assumption 3 The reforms’ set is
Reform Reform’s content
∅ No reform
A Increase retirement Age (↑ a)
B Reduce pension Benefits (↓ b)
C Increase Contribution rates (↑ τ)
Reform ∅ is the default outcome when agents do not agree on which reform to im-
plement. In this case, the PAYG parameters remain the same and everyone, including
the retirees, support its deficit. Reform B reduces pension benefits for current and future
retirees, it is equivalent to introducing a tax on pensions. Reforms A and C correspond
respectively to an increase of the retirement age and of the contribution rate.6
Notice that the steady state problem had only two choice variables (a, τ) while the
third PAYG parameter (b) was given by the budget-balanced condition (assumption 1).
Now, there is one additional choice variable (b) since the PAYG budget might be unbal-
anced.
6We assume in what follows that retirees do not go back to work when retirement is postponed. In
other words, reform A only applies to people working at the time of the reform.
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Reforms A,B or C reduce the deficit of the pension system. Nevertheless, the deficit
starts growing again until the next steady state. The PAYG’s deficit plays two roles in
this model. First, as already mentioned before, it allows some imbalancement in PAYG
budget before reform takes place, enabling the model to study the timing of the reform.
Second, if we required the PAYG budget to be balanced at each time t, then it would
be necessary to permanently and continuously reform PAYG during the demographic
transition.
4.3 Preferences over small reforms
In this section, we consider marginal reforms of the pension system at time t0, at which
the fertility shock occurs. The following lemma, proven in the appendix, will be useful in
analyzing these reforms.
Lemma 1 Denote Rr(x) = −xu′′(x)/u′(x) the coefficient of relative risk aversion.7 Then:
(i)
∂
(
1
1 + ρt
u′(1− τ ss − Tt)
)
/∂t > 0;
(ii)
∂
(
ρt
1 + ρt
u′ (bss − Tt)
)
/∂t

> 0 , if Rr(.) > 1
= 0 , if Rr(.) = 1
< 0 , if Rr(.) < 1
.
4.3.1 Reducing pension benefits or increasing the contribution rate?
We first compare reforms B and C. The first reform consists in decreasing the benefit
level from bss to bss − db at time t0 where db represents a marginal increment; the second
reform consists in raising the payroll tax rate from τ ss to τ ss + dτ .
In the following proposition, we argue that any worker either prefers to increase the
contribution rate or decrease the level of benefits, compared to the no reform case.
Lemma 2 A worker of age x at t0 either wants to decrease pension benefits or increase
the payroll tax rate marginally. He cannot favor or reject both reforms at the same time.
7Admittedly, relative risk aversion is not the proper concept to use as there is no uncertainty in this
model. One should however note that the coefficient of relative risk aversion corresponds to the elasticity
of the marginal utility of consumption, which is more accurate in our framework. Abusing language, we
shall continue to name this parameter relative risk aversion in the remainder of the paper.
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Proof. See appendix.
When the payroll tax rate is increased, individuals consume less during the working
period. But they consume more during retirement as the income tax needed to balance
the government budget is lowered. An increase in pension benefits also leads to more
consumption during retirement. And it also leads to a drop in consumption during the
working period, as it implies a higher income tax. Lemma 2 shows that the magnitude of
these effects is exactly the same for reforms B and C.
In the next lemma, we get more insight into the workers’ preferences toward the reform.
Lemma 3 The marginal benefit of raising the contribution rate is increasing with worker’s
age if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than 1.
Proof. See appendix.
When the payroll tax rate is increased, consumption in the working period is re-
duced. As older individuals spend less time working, they are less hurt by this effect.
Moreover, consumption during retirement is increased. This benefit being declining over
time (∂Tt/∂τ decreases over time), older workers also tend to benefit more from this effect
(when relative risk aversion is below 1, this is true even though they have a lower marginal
utility of consumption (see lemma 1)).
Understanding that the retirees always benefit from an increase in the tax rate and,
conversely, are hurt by a cut in benefits, we can draw on figure 4 the preferences for small
reforms B and C of all the living individuals at time t0 (when relative risk aversion is
below 1).
It is clear from this figure that the preferences of the majority of the voters depend on
the relative position of the median age individual and the individual indifferent between
the two reforms. Recall that xd is the age of the decisive individuals in the steady state
before the shock. We determine in the next proposition the preferences of individuals xd
over reforms B and C when the initial steady state entails perfect consumption smoothing.
Proposition 3 Assume that 1−τ ss = bss. Then, if the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is below 1, individuals xd favor a marginal decrease in pension benefits.
Proof. See appendix.
14
x
a
−dU/db
dU/dτ
Figure 4: Welfare effects of reforms B and C
This result is somewhat surprising. It says that, when there is perfect consumption
smoothing in the steady state before the shock, the decisive voter in this steady state
prefers to cut benefits rather than to increase the payroll tax rate. This latter reform
however generates a larger lifetime income than the former. To see this, consider a
marginal increase in τ of size dτ . An individual aged x incur a loss of income equal to
dτ(ass − x)
and a benefit
dτ
t0+l−x∫
t0
∂Tv
∂τ
dv = dτ
t0+l−x∫
t0
ρv
1 + ρv
dv,
generating a net loss of income
dτ
ass − x− t0+l−x∫
t0
ρv
1 + ρv
dv
 .
On the other hand, when pension benefits are cut by an amount db, the net loss of income
is
db
l − ass − t0+l−x∫
t0
1
1 + ρv
dv
 .
With positive population growth, the lower bound on ρv is ass/(l − ass). Therefore
dτ
ass − x− t0+l−x∫
t0
ρv
1 + ρv
dv
 < dτ(ass
l
− 1)x ≤ 0
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and
db
l − ass − t0+l−x∫
t0
1
1 + ρv
dv
 > db(l − ass)x ≥ 0.
In words, reform C generates an increase in lifetime income whereas reform B leads to
lower income. This does not however imply that individuals will favor such a reform
over the status-quo, as proposition 3 demonstrates. The cost of this reform is that it
may allocate consumption at different dates in an undesirable way for the individual.
There is thus a trade-off between the increase in life-cycle income and the distortion of
the consumption pattern. Proposition 3 shows that this trade-off is resolved in favor or
reform B for the individual decisive in the steady state (provided that it entails perfect
consumption smoothing).
Note finally that proposition 3 holds when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
below 1. For a larger relative risk aversion, it may well be that the majority of the voters
prefer reform C. In this case, the “higher income” effect of reform C would dominate the
misallocation of consumption over the life-cycle it induces.
We state in the following corollary the implications of proposition 3 for the preferences
of the majority of the voters over the reform.
Corollary 1 Suppose that xd is larger than the median age at time t0, xm. Then, under
the assumptions of proposition 3, the majority of the population vote for reform B.
Proof. If a marginal decrease in b is beneficial to xd, then, by lemma 3, it is also beneficial
to every younger worker. When xd ≥ xm, this leads to the conclusion that the majority
of the voters benefit from a marginal cut in benefits.
4.3.2 Increasing the retirement age
We now turn to the reform of the retirement age. Obviously, the retirees always favor an
increase in the retirement age, as it allows to decrease the tax T at no cost for them.
Reform A increases the retirement age from ass to ass+da while keeping the contribu-
tion rate and pension benefits at their steady state level. To assess the effect of a marginal
increase in a at time t0 on the life-cycle utility of a worker aged x, we differentiate (1)
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with respect to a:
dU
da
= e−β(ass−x)(u(1− τ ss − Tt0+ass−x)− γ − u (bss − Tt0+ass−x))
−
t0+ass−x∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′(1− τ ss − Tv)dv +
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′ (bss − Tv) dv
 . (12)
As far as the workers are concerned, the cost of increasing the retirement age, for τ and b
fixed at their steady state values, is e−β(ass−x)(u (1− τ ss − T )− γ − u (bss − T )). On the
other hand, the benefit corresponds to the decrease in T . By differentiating (12) with
respect to x, we evaluate how the net benefit for a worker of increasing the retirement
age varies with age:
d2U
dxda
= (T˙t0+ass−x +
∂Tt0+ass−x
∂a
)e−β(ass−x)(u′(1− τ ss − Tt0+ass−x)− u′ (bss − Tt0+ass−x))
+ βe−β(ass−x)(u(1− τ ss − Tt0+ass−x)− γ − u (bss − Tt0+ass−x))
+
∂Tt0+l−x
∂a
u′ (bss − Tt0+l−x) . (13)
We shall continue to assume in this section that 1− τ ss = bss. Under this assumption, the
first term on the right hand side vanishes and the second one becomes −βγe−β(ass−x) < 0.
Noting that ∂Tt/∂a < 0 and thus that the last term is negative, we can conclude that
d2U/dxda is negative. This leads to the next lemma.
Lemma 4 Assume that 1 − τ ss = bss. The marginal benefit of postponing retirement is
then decreasing with age.
This result is intuitive. It basically derives from the fact that younger individuals are
farther away from retirement than older ones and therefore benefit from the decrease in
the income tax caused by the reform for a longer time span.
We now want to sign expression (12). Consider an individual close to retirement at
time t0 (x close to ass); for this individual, (12) becomes:
dU
da
= u(1− τ ss − Tt0)− γ − u (bss − Tt0)−
t0+l−ass∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′ (bss − Tv) dv
= u(1− τ ss)− γ − u (bss)−
t0+l−ass∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′ (bss − Tv) dv,
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where we have used the fact that Tt0 = 0.
The retirement age in the steady state before the shock is given by (11). Using this
condition yields:
dU
da
=
1
β
(e−β(l−ass) − 1)u′ (bss) τ ss∂ρss
∂a
−
t0+l−ass∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′ (bss − Tv) dv.
Using (19) in the appendix,
∂Tt
∂a
= −τ ss∂ρt
∂a
1 + ρss
(1 + ρt)
2
.
Differentiating (18) gives:
∂ρt
∂a
= n
enl
enl − enass (1 + ρt),
and therefore
∂Tt
∂a
= −τ ssn e
nl
enl − enass
1 + ρss
(1 + ρt)
. (14)
It thus appears that ∂Tt/∂a is increasing with ρt. As ρt is decreasing over time, we have:
0 >
∂Tt0
∂a
>
∂Tt0+l−ass
∂a
.
Moreover, Tt is increasing over time. Therefore
0 < u′ (bss − Tt0) < u′ (bss − Tt0+l−ass) .
These two inequalities imply that
t0+l−ass∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′ (bss − Tv) dv > − 1
β
(e−β(l−ass) − 1)∂Tt0
∂a
u′ (bss − Tt0) .
Observing that Tt0 = 0 and
∂Tt0
∂a
= −τ ss∂ρss
∂a
1
(1 + ρss)
,
we thus have
dU
da
<
1
β
(e−β(l−ass) − 1)u′ (bss) τ ss∂ρss
∂a
− 1
β
(e−β(l−ass) − 1)u′ (bss) τ ss∂ρss
∂a
1
(1 + ρss)
< 0.
It should be emphasized that we have used expression (18) for developing our argument
and this expression is only valid for t ≤ t0 + ass. Therefore this argument holds true as
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x
a
dU/da
Figure 5: Welfare effects of reform A
long as l − ass < ass, which means that individuals spend more time working than on
retirement. Under this assumption, we obtain the following proposition.8
Proposition 4 Assume l − ass < ass. Then the individuals close to retirement at t0 are
made worse-off by a marginal increase in the retirement age.
This proposition, combined with lemma 4, implies that the preferences toward reform
A of the living individuals at date t0 can be represented as on figure 5.
To get more insights with respect to the collective decision about the reform, we
determine in the next proposition the preferences of individuals aged xd at the time of
the reform, t0.
Proposition 5 Assume that 1 − τ ss = bss. Then individuals xd benefit from a marginal
increase in a at time t0.
Proof. See appendix.
We thus have shown that individuals xd would vote for A at time t0. Strikingly, this
result does not depend on the disutility of labor γ. Even when this latter is high would
individuals aged xd want to increase the retirement age. This comes from the fact that the
8It can be shown that, when relative risk aversion is lower than 1, this result extends to the case
t > t0 + ass.
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retirement age is optimally chosen in the steady state. Accordingly, if they have a large
disutility of labor, people choose to retire early in the steady state. Understanding this,
proposition 5 shows that, following the demographic shock, the steady state decisive voter
always prefers to increase the retirement age, thereby lowering the income tax needed to
balance the PAYG budget, rather than keeping the parameters of the system unaltered
and incurring larger deficits.
In the following corollary, we state the implication of proposition 5 for the majority
preferences over reform A.
Corollary 2 Suppose that xd is larger than the median age at time t0, xm. Then, when
1− τ ss = bss, the majority of the population vote for reform A.
Proof. Combine lemma 4 with proposition 5.
We have thus established a case for reform A. In the previous section, we have shown
that the majority is also likely to vote for reform B against the status quo. What about
the comparison between A and B? It turns out to be a difficult question with no clear
analytical answer. We thus rely on numerical simulations (section 5) to get more insights
about the comparison between these two reforms. But before we analyze in the next
section how the timing of the reform affects its political support.
4.4 Timing of the reform
So far, the reform was assumed to take place at date t0. We now consider the possibility
that it happens at a later date t > t0. We first investigate whether agents gain or lose
from postponing the reforms. Then we analyze the evolution of the political support for
each reform over time. We assume for simplicity in this section that the agents do not
discount the future (β = 0).
4.4.1 Costs and benefits of postponing the reforms
In order to compute the benefit of postponing the reforms for a worker, we consider that
each reform is approved at time t ∈ (t0, t0 + ass − x).9 The lifetime utility of a worker
9This assumption means that a worker at t0 is still working at the time of the reform. This allows us
to clearly distinguish between the preferences of workers and retirees.
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aged x at t0 when reform C is approved at time t, after the shock and before he retires, is
Uw (x;C, t) =
t∫
t0
(u (1− τ ss − Tv (∅))− γ) dv +
t0+ass−x∫
t
(u (1− τ ss −∆τ − Tv (C))− γ) dv
+
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
u (bss − Tv (C)) dv.
The benefit of postponing reform C is thus
dUw (x;C, t)
dt
= u (1− τ ss − Tt (∅))− u (1− τ ss −∆τ − Tt (C)) > 0. (15)
Equation (15) shows that, when reform C is postponed, the workers enjoy smaller contri-
bution rates, τ ss < τ ss+∆τ , but supports higher PAYG’s deficit, Tt (∅) > Tt (C), both for
a longer time span. The increase in the contribution rate is a transfer from the workers to
everyone in the system. The compound effect of reform C is thus negative during working
time.10 It follows that postponing reform C benefits the workers. However this hurts the
retirees, since these agents do not support the increase in contribution but benefit from
the deficit reduction.
The equivalent formulas for reform B are
Uw (x;B, t) =
t∫
t0
(u (1− τ ss − Tv (∅))− γ) dv +
t0+ass−x∫
t
(u (1− τ ss − Tv (B))− γ) dv
+
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
u (bss −∆b− Tv (B)) dv
and
dUw (x;B, t)
dt
= u (1− τ ss − Tt (∅))− u (1− τ ss − Tt (B)) < 0. (16)
Reform B reduces the PAYG deficit and future pension benefits. Reducing benefits now
or later does not change the worker’s future benefits (as long as the reform is carried out
before retiring). However, postponing reform B delays the benefit of deficit reduction.
Therefore, postponing reform B hurts the workers. However, this benefits the retirees,
since they will enjoy higher benefits for a longer time.
10Substitute τ t by τss into (19) to obtain Tt (∅). Substitute τ t by τss + ∆τ to obtain Tt (C). Then, it
is straightforward to show that τss + ∆τ + Tt (C) > τss + Tt (∅).
21
The formulas for reform A are
Uw (x;A, t) =
t∫
t0
(u (1− τ ss − Tv (∅))− γ) dv +
t0+ass+∆a−x∫
t
(u (1− τ ss − Tv (A))− γ) dv
+
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass+∆a−x
u (bss − Tv (A)) dv
and
dUw (x;A, t)
dt
= u (1− τ ss − Tt (∅))− u (1− τ ss − Tt (A)) < 0.
Reform A reduces the PAYG deficit and increases the retirement age. Similarly to reform
B, increasing the retirement age now or later does not change the age at which the worker
will retire (as long as reform is carried out before retiring). In the same way, postponing
this reform delays the benefit of deficit reduction. As a consequence, postponing reform
A hurts the workers. It also hurts the retirees, for whom the benefit of deficit reduction
is delayed.
Table 3 summarizes these effects. Is shows that, if reforms A or B are expected to
happen somewhere in the near future, it is better for workers to carry them out at once
than later on. However, delaying reform C is beneficial. Concerning the retirees, the only
reform worth postponing is the one that reduces their pension benefits.
Table 3: Effects of postponing reforms
Reform Effect on workers Effect on retirees
A − −
B − +
C + −
4.4.2 Evolution of the political support over time
The implication of the results in the previous section on the evolution of the political
support for the reforms over time is the following. Consider reform B for example. The
worker who is indifferent between reform B and no reform at a given date t is made
worse-off when delaying this reform (and this is true by continuity for the workers just
younger than him). Therefore, from this effect, the political support for B is reduced
if the reform is undertaken at date t + dt instead of t. There is however another effect
working in the opposite direction. Between dates t and t+ dt, some individuals are newly
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born. From lemma 3 and 2, we know that they favor B over the status quo and thus that
it tends to make the political support for this reform bigger. The same kinds of arguments
can be developed for reforms C and A.
Numerical examples in section 5 show that the net effect can be positive or negative,
that is the political support for, say reform B, may increase or decrease with time. But
before turning to these examples, we provide further analytical insights.
Let define xit, i = A,B,C, as the age of the workers indifferent between implementing
reform i at date t and no reform.
Using (21), evaluated at date t with no discounting, xCt is implicitly determined by
solving
dU
dτ
=
t+ass−xCt∫
t
− 1
1 + ρv
u′(1− τ ss − Tv)dv +
t+l−xCt∫
t+ass−xCt
ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) dv = 0. (17)
Differentiating this equation with respect to t, we can determine how xCt changes when
reform C is postponed marginally. The following lemma states a sufficient condition on
the utility function for this variable to be increasing with the timing of the reform.
Lemma 5 xCt is increasing with t if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower than
1.
Proof. The differentiation of (17) leads to
x˙Ct =
(1/(1 + ρt))u
′(1− τ ss − Tt)− (1/(1 + ρt+ass−xCt ))u′(1− τ ss − Tt+ass−xCt )
−d2U/dxdτ
+
−(ρt+ass−xCt /(1 + ρt+ass−xCt ))u′(bss − Tt+ass−xCt ) + (ρt+l−xCt /(1 + ρt+l−xCt ))u′(bss − Tt+l−xCt )
−d2U/dxdτ > 0.
Lemma 1 implies that the numerator is negative and lemma 3 that the denominator is
also negative, both when relative risk aversion is smaller than 1. Note again that this is
just a sufficient condition.
This lemma implies that the curve dU/dτ (resp. −dU/db) shifts downward (resp. up-
ward) in figure 4. People who support reform B are those younger than xCt , representing
a proportion Ft(x
C
t ) of the total population. Symmetrically, by using lemma 2, the pro-
portion of people supporting C is 1 − Ft(xCt ). The variation with time of the political
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support for these reforms is thus given by
∂
∂t
Ft(x
C
t ) = x˙
C
t F
′
t(x
C
t ) + F˙t(x
C
t ).
The first term on the right hand side captures the shift of the curve −dU/db as t increases.
From lemma 5 it is positive, meaning that the people who support reform B are older and
older as time goes on. However the second term is negative: due to population aging, the
proportion of people younger than a given age is declining over time. These two effects
are thus of opposite direction. The evolution over time of the political support for reforms
B and C depends on which of the two dominates.
We now turn to reform A. Individuals xAt are defined implicitly by the condition
dU
da
= u(1− τ ss − Tt+ass−xAt )− γ − u(bss − Tt+ass−xAt )
−
t+ass−x
A
t∫
t
∂Tv
∂a
u′(1− τ ss − Tv)dv +
t+l−xAt∫
t+ass−xAt
∂Tv
∂a
u′ (bss − Tv) dv
 = 0.
Differentiating this expression, we obtain:
x˙At = −T˙t+ass−x(u′(1− τ ss − Tt+ass−xAt )− u′(bss − Tt+ass−xAt ))
+
∂Tt
∂a
u′(1− τ ss − Tt)−
∂Tt+ass−xAt
∂a
u′(1− τ ss − Tt+ass−xAt )
+
∂Tt+ass−xAt
∂a
u′(bss − Tt+ass−xAt )−
∂Tt+l−xAt
∂a
u′(bss − Tt+l−xAt ).
It can be shown that the sum of the first three terms on the right hand side is negative.
However, one can also show that the sum of the last two terms is positive. Therefore the
sign of x˙At is ambiguous.
5 Numerical simulations
We have performed several numerical simulations with a isoelastic utility function. Most
of the theoretical results in the previous sections were obtained with perfect consumption
smoothing in the steady state and a coefficient of relative risk aversion lower than 1. The
first aim of these simulations consists in checking the robustness of our results when there
is not perfect consumption smoothing and relative risk aversion is larger than 1. It turns
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out that the results in proposition 3 and corollary 1 continue to hold in this case: reform
B is majority preferred to reform C, unless the discount rate is very high and/or relative
risk aversion is much larger than 1. This is illustrated in the figure below, in which we
have drawn the effect of reforms B and C on the median voter’s utility. In the region
with a + (resp. −), the reform is beneficial (resp. detrimental) to the median voter.11
Figure 6: Effect of reforms B and C on the median voter
As far as reform A is concerned, the numerical examples suggest that the political
support for this reform is very high, this reform being majority preferred to reforms
B and C in all the simulations. Moreover, when relative risk aversion is lower than 1
and there is no discounting, the political support for reforms A and B increases over time
whereas the political support for C is declining, except notably at the end of the transition
11It appears clearly from these figures that, when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is low enough,
reform C is majority preferred for any discount factor value lower than 0.2. When individuals do not
discount the future, one can show analytically that they choose to consume more during retirement than
during working life: 1 − τss < bss. Only when the discount rate is high enough should they prefer to
consume more when working. In the simulations summarized in figure 6, the threshold value for the
discount factor is around 0.1. At this point, there is perfect consumption smoothing in the steady state:
1− τss = bss. These simulations therefore show that the analytical results derived in proposition 3, that
hold under perfect consumption smoothing and a coefficient of relative risk aversion lower than 1, are
robust to different parameters specifications.
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period. This is illustrated on the graph below, that shows the evolution of the political
support for the three possible reforms over time.
Figure 7: Evolution of the political support over time
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the political support for different
parametric reforms of the PAYG pension system, when confronted to a downward fertility
shock.
Its first contribution is about the effects of a downward fertility shock. This shock
produces a long lasting demographic transition that takes a whole lifetime to accomplish.
During this transition, the PAYG deficit steadily increases over time.
Our main results concern the preferences of the population toward the reforms. We
have shown that the majority of the population is more likely to approve reform B (cut in
benefits) than reform C (increase in the contribution rate). However, numerical simula-
tions suggest that these two reforms are dominated (in the sense of receiving less political
support) by reform A (increase in the retirement age). This latter reform indeed garners
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the votes of a large fraction of the workers and of all the retirees. In these numerical
simulations, we also observe that the political support for reforms A and B (resp. C)
tends to increase (resp. decrease) over time.
This analysis relies on a number of simplifying assumptions, that should be relaxed
in future research. Two extensions deserve a special attention. First, taxation of labor
income does not create distortions in this model. One can guess that the political support
for increasing the payroll tax rate would be undermined if such tax distortions were taken
into account. Second, we assume no savings and this of course has an impact on the
preferences of the agents toward the reform. We conjecture that introducing savings
would modify the analysis in two main directions. On the one hand, this would allow
individuals to better smooth their consumption across time. As the main drawback of
reform C is to constrain individuals in their consumption profile, the introduction of
savings would make the political support for this reform more important. On the other
hand, if one assumes that, after the demographic shock, the return from savings dominate
the PAYG system, then people would like to make the PAYG system as small as possible.
This effect would reinforce the political support for reform B.
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Technical appendix
A Demographic transition
1) We first show that a decrease in the fertility rate (of any magnitude) creates a transi-
tion period of length l. During this demographic transition, ρ is strictly decreasing (the
dependency rate is strictly increasing): ρ˙t < 0, for t ∈ (to, to + l).
Assumption 2 implies that the number of agents born at t is{
ent , from −∞ to to
entoem(t−to) , from to to +∞.
a) Beginning of transition: t ∈ [t0, t0 + a]
ρbegin (t) ≡
to∫
t−a
envdv + e(n−m)to
t∫
to
emvdv
t−a∫
t−l
envdv
=
ento−nt − e−na + n
m
ento−nt
(
em(t−to) − 1
)
e−na − e−nl .
(18)
To prove that ρbegin is decreasing:
ρ˙begin (t) =
ento−nt
((
nm−n2
m
) (
em(t−to) − 1
)
− n
)
e−na − e−nl < 0.
b) End of transition: t ∈ [t0 + a, t0 + l]
ρend (t) ≡
e(n−m)to
t∫
t−a
emvdv
to∫
t−l
envdv + e(n−m)to
t−a∫
to
emvdv
=
ento (1− e−ma)
m
n
(ento−mt+mto − en(t−l)−mt+mto) + ento (e−ma − e−mt+mto) .
To prove that ρend is decreasing:
ρ˙end (t) =
−ento (1− e−ma)
(
m
n
(
−mento−mt+mto − (n−m) en(t−l)−mt+mto
)
+mento−mt+mto
)
(
m
n
(ento−mt+mto − en(t−l)−mt+mto) + ento (e−ma − 1)
)2 .
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Multiplying by n/m gives
−ento (1− e−ma) (n−m) emto−mt
(
ento − en(t−l)
)
n
m
(
m
n
(ento−mt+mto − en(t−l)−mt+mto) + ento (e−ma − 1)
)2 < 0.
c) New steady-state
ρnss (t) ≡
e(n−m)to
t∫
t−a
emvdv
e(n−m)to
t−a∫
t−l
emvdv
=
(
emt−em(t−a)
m
)
(
em(t−a)−em(t−l)
m
) = 1− 1ema1
ema
− 1
eml
.
2) We now prove that, if no reform is undertaken, then the PAYG per capita deficit is
forever positive and strictly increasing during the demographic transition: Tt (∅) > 0, for
t > to; T˙t (∅) > 0, for t ∈ (to, to + l), where ∅ stands for no reform.
Solving (3) for Tt and using the equalities (N
w
t +N
r
t )/N
r
t = 1+ρt and (N
w
t +N
r
t )/N
w
t =
(1 + ρt)/ρt gives
Tt =
1
1 + ρt
bt − ρt
1 + ρt
τ t. (19)
Substituting the steady state pension and contribution rate gives
Tt (∅) = ρss − ρt
1 + ρt
τ ss. (20)
Recalling that ρss > ρt, we obtain that Tt (∅) > 0, ∀t > to.
We then compute T˙t (∅):
T˙t (∅) = − ρ˙t (1 + ρt) + (ρss − ρt) ρ˙t
(1 + ρt)
2 τ ss.
Using our previous results on the evolution of the dependency rate, this is positive.
B Proof of lemma 1
Use (19) to substitute 1 − τ ss − Tt = 1 − τ ss(1 + ρss)/(1 + ρt) into u′(1 − τ ss − Tt).
Differentiating:
∂(1/(1 + ρt))u
′(1− τ ss − Tt)
∂t
= − ρ˙t
(1 + ρt)
2
(
u′(1− 1 + ρss
1 + ρt
τ ss)− 1
1 + ρt
(1 + ρss) τ ssu
′′(1− 1 + ρss
1 + ρt
τ ss)
)
> 0.
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Use (19) to substitute bss − Tt = (ρt/(1 + ρt))τ ss(1 + ρss) into u′ (bss − Tt). Differenti-
ating:
∂(ρt/(1 + ρt))u
′ (bss − Tt)
∂t
=
ρ˙t
(1 + ρt)
2
(
u′(
ρt
1 + ρt
τ ss (1 + ρss)) +
ρt
1 + ρt
τ ss (1 + ρss)u
′′(
ρt
1 + ρt
τ ss (1 + ρss))
)
.
The expression above is positive (negative) if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
greater (lower) than 1.
C Proof of lemma 2
From (1), the lifetime utility of a worker aged x at t0 under no reform is:
Uwt0 (x) =
t0+ass−x∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(u (1− τ ss − Tv)− γ) dv +
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
e−β(v−t0)u (bss − Tv) dv.
The effect of a marginal increase of the payroll tax rate on his utility is
dU
dτ
(x) =
t0+ass−x∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(−1−∂Tv
∂τ
)u′(1−τ ss−Tv)dv+
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
e−β(v−t0)(−∂Tv
∂τ
)u′ (bss − Tv) dv.
From (19):
∂Tv
∂τ
= − ρv
1 + ρv
,
and thus
dU
dτ
(x) =
t0+ass−x∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(− 1
1 + ρv
)u′(1−τ ss−Tv)dv+
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
e−β(v−t0)
ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) dv.
(21)
To determine the impact of a marginal decrease in pension benefits, we note that,
from (19),
∂Tv
∂b
=
1
1 + ρv
,
and compute:
dU
db
(x) =
t0+ass−x∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(−∂Tv
∂b
)u′(1− τ ss − Tv)dv +
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
e−β(v−t0)(1 +
∂Tv
∂b
)u′ (bss − Tv) dv
=
t0+ass−x∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(− 1
1 + ρv
)u′(1− τ ss − Tv)dv +
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
e−β(v−t0)
ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) dv.
The two expressions for dU (x) /dτ and dU (x) /db are identical. Hence the result.
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D Proof of lemma 3
Differentiating dU/dτ (given in (21)) with respect to x, we obtain
d2U
dxdτ
=
d
dx
t0+ass−x∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(− 1
1 + ρv
)u′(1− τ ss − Tv)dv +
t0+l−x∫
t0+ass−x
e−β(v−t0)
ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) dv

=
e−β(ass−x)
1 + ρt0+ass−x
u′(1− τ ss − Tt0+a−x)
+
ρt0+ass−x
1 + ρt0+ass−x
e−β(ass−x)u′ (bss − Tt0+ass−x)− e−β(l−x)
ρt0+l−x
1 + ρt0+l−x
u′ (bss − Tt0+l−x) . (22)
By lemma 1 and noting that e−β(ass−x) > e−β(l−x), the difference between the two last
terms is positive for a relative risk aversion lower than 1. This condition is thus sufficient
for having d2U/dxdτ > 0.
E Proof of proposition 3
We write (21) for the individual aged xd:
dU
dτ
=
t0+ass−xd∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(− 1
1 + ρv
)u′(1−τ ss−Tv)dv+
t0+l−xd∫
t0+ass−xd
e−β(v−t0)
ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) dv.
When 1− τ ss = bss,
u′(1− τ ss − Tv)
u′ (bss − Tv) =
u′(1− τ ss)
u′ (bss)
= 1.
As xd obtains his optimal contribution rate in the steady state, we have from (9):
u′(1− τ ss)
u′ (bss)
=
e−β(l−xd) − e−β(ass−xd)
e−β(ass−xd) − 1 ρss.
Coming back to the expression for dU/dτ and substituting the previous relationships, we
have
dU
dτ
=
e−β(l−xd) − e−β(ass−xd)
e−β(ass−xd) − 1
t0+ass−xd∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(− ρss
1 + ρv
)u′ (bss − Tv) dv +
t0+l−xd∫
t0+ass−xd
e−β(v−t0)
ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) dv
<
e−β(l−xd) − e−β(ass−xd)
e−β(ass−xd) − 1
t0+ass−xd∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)(− ρv
1 + ρv
)u′ (bss − Tv) dv +
t0+l−xd∫
t0+ass−xd
e−β(v−t0)
ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) dv,
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where we have used the fact that ρss > ρv.
Using lemma 1, we have that, when relative risk aversion is lower than 1,
− ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) < −
ρt+ass−xd
1 + ρt+ass−xd
u′ (bss − Tt+ass−xd) , ∀v < t+ ass − xd
ρv
1 + ρv
u′ (bss − Tv) <
ρt+ass−xd
1 + ρt+ass−xd
u′ (bss − Tt+ass−xd) , ∀v > t+ ass − xd
and thus
dU
dτ
< (e−β(l−xd) − e−β(ass−xd))(− ρt+ass−xd
1 + ρt+ass−xd
u′(bss − Tt+ass−xd ))
+(e−β(l−xd) − e−β(ass−xd)) ρt+ass−xd
1 + ρt+ass−xd
u′(bss − Tt+ass−xd ) = 0.
F Proof of proposition 5
We rewrite (12) for the individual xd:
dU
da
= e−β(ass−xd)(u(1− τ ss − Tt0+ass−xd)− γ − u (bss − Tt0+ass−xd))
−
t0+ass−xd∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′(1− τ ss − Tv)dv +
t0+l−xd∫
t0+ass−xd
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′ (bss − Tv) dv
 .
Under the assumption that 1− τ ss = bss and making use of (11), it becomes:
dU
da
=
1
β
(e−β(l−ass) − 1)u′ (bss) τ ss∂ρss
∂a
−
t0+l−xd∫
t0
e−β(v−t0)
∂Tv
∂a
u′ (bss − Tv) dv.
From (14):
∂Tv
∂a
= −τ ssn e
nl
enl − enass
1 + ρss
(1 + ρv)
.
Recalling that ρv < ρss, this implies:
−∂Tv
∂a
> τ ssn
enl
enl − enass .
Noting that u′ (bss − Tv) > u′ (bss), we obtain
dU
da
>
1
β
(e−β(l−xd) − e−β(ass−xd))u′ (bss) τ ssnenassenl e
nl − 1
(enl − enass)2
− 1
β
(e−β(l−xd) − 1)u′ (bss) τ ssn e
nl
enl − enass . (23)
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We then make use of the fact that xd is decisive in the steady state and thus obtains his
optimal contribution rate. Using (9) with the assumption 1− τ ss = bss, we obtain:
e−β(l−xd) − e−β(ass−xd) = 1
ρss
(e−β(ass−xd) − 1)
=
enl − enass
enl(enass − 1)(e
−β(ass−xd) − 1)
⇔ e−β(l−xd) − 1 = (e−β(ass−xd) − 1)e
nass
enl
enl − 1
enass − 1.
Substituting into (23):
dU
da
>
1
β
u′ (bss) τ ssn(e−β(ass−xd) − 1)
(
enass
enl − enass
enl − 1
enass − 1 −
enass
enl − enass
enl − 1
enass − 1
)
= 0.
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